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Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in July 2015 to all five Central Asian Republics (CARs), 
followed by his visit to Ufa, Russia, to attend the joint summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) and BRICS (the grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as well as the informal 
summit of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), promise a new phase in India’s comprehensive 
engagement with the region. The revitalisation of its role in Central Asia comes after decades of inaction 
and inertia, punctuated by ceremonial displays of goodwill and cordiality. Hampered by lack of physical 
connectivity and transport links to the region, India is developing alternative channels for accessing 
Central Asia via Iran and Afghanistan. The obvious aim is to expand economic activities, particularly trade 
with Central Asia, but there is also the need to boost India’s energy security and strategic position. 
India is carving out its strategic role in the region as a neighbour, regional power and a global actor within 
the regional parameters set by China’s economic pre-eminence, Russia’s geopolitical dominance, and the 
declining influence and credibility of the West.
Although a “late starter”, India has the advantage of deploying its soft power and neutral but favourable 
image in the region to strengthen bilateral ties in several niche areas – IT, knowledge transfer, enterprise, 
innovation, medicine and health, culture and tourism – as well as in the spheres of transport connectivity, 
energy security and strategic cooperation. 
India’s efforts to become a visible strategic actor depend on its ability to establish a close strategic 
bilateral partnership with the CARs, advance greater security cooperation with Russia by building on 
its close ties with Moscow and develop closer collaboration with China’s infrastructural development 
initiatives in Central Asia. India also needs to go beyond its preoccupation with Pakistan. 
As a new member of the SCO, while also seeking partnership with the EEU, India has the potential in the 
longer term to become an impartial third vector. It can do this by consolidating its status as a normative 
power with the capacity to make the requisite technological and financial investments in energy and 
transportation infrastructure, facilitate vital security arrangements and enhance its standing in the global 
arena by pushing for transformation of norms and institutions of international governance. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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INTRODUCTION
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit in July 
2015 to all 5 CARs was a decisive shift from the 
clichéd iterations of deep historical connections 
and friendship to a new economic and strategic 
engagement of India with the region. This was 
the first comprehensive visit by an Indian prime 
minister since P.V. Narasimha Rao went on a 
goodwill tour of the CARs in 1993 and 1995.
Modi’s six-day tour, followed by a visit to Ufa in 
Russia to attend the SCO-BRICS summit, which 
confirmed India and Pakistan as full members 
from 2016, was a fresh unveiling of India as a 
regional and global power, and was noted by 
the international media. The Deutsche Welle 
noted the visit as scripting a new chapter in 
India’s relations with the region, whereas the 
Telegraph went on to describe it as designed to 
challenge China’s dominance.1 Its key outcome 
was upgrading India-Central Asia relations to 
a new level by expanding cooperation in the 
trade, infrastructure, and energy sectors, making 
India visible as a neutral third vector, poised to 
deploy its soft power in a regional geopolitical 
and economic terrain dominated respectively by 
Russia and China.
Source: Wikimedia Commons
1 “India’s Modi sets sight on Central Asia,” Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.com/en/indias-modi-sets-sights-on-central-
asia/a-18566797; James Kilner, “Modi in unprecedented grand tour of Central Asia”. The Telegraph, 12 July 2015. http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/11735255/Modi-tours-Central-Asia-in-Great-Game-move.html
3
2 “India’s Modi sets sight on Central Asia,” Deutsche Welle. http://www.dw.com/en/indias-modi-sets-sights-on-central-
asia/a-18566797; James Kilner, “Modi in unprecedented grand tour of Central Asia”. The Telegraph, 12 July 2015. http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/india/11735255/Modi-tours-Central-Asia-in-Great-Game-move.html
3 C. Raja Mohan, “A passage to inner Asia,” The Indian Express, 6 July 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/a-
passage-to-inner-asia/
4 Cited in Marlene Laruelle and Sebastien Peyrouse. 2013. Mapping Central Asia: Indian Perceptions and Strategies. Berlington, 
VTL: Ashgate. P. 162.
Background: Goodwill without Depth
India’s “noticeable absence”2 in its northern 
neighbourhood has been an enigma, given the 
strength of its historical ties to the region and 
a close strategic partnership all through the 
Soviet years. While all major and middle ranking 
powers in the neighbourhood and beyond– 
from Japan, South Korea to Turkey, Iran and 
even Pakistan – expanded economic, trade, 
political and cultural partnership with Central 
Asia and established their specific niches, India 
stayed disengaged, distant though deferential. 
India-Central Asia relations remained stuck in 
ceremonial displays of cordiality, expressions 
of goodwill through ritualistic evocations of 
common denominators such as Silk Road, 
Sufism, the Mughal connection (few in India 
know that the term is a distortion of “Mongol”) 
and celebrations of Soviet-era camaraderie. The 
tremendous popularity of Hindi films, Central 
Asians’ regard for movie icons Raj Kapoor and 
Mithun Chakravarty and adoration for Jawaharlal 
Nehru and Indira Gandhi sustained the fiction 
of close relations in the actual absence of any 
significant people-to-people ties, particularly 
the lack of interest in the region on the part 
of India’s policymakers, business, media and 
intelligentsia.
India’s lack of visibility in the region stems 
first from the lack of geographical connectivity 
and a transportation network. India has been 
seeking alternative access to the region via 
Iran across the Caspian Sea and via rail links 
through Afghanistan through the construction 
of an International North South Transport 
Corridor (INSTC). But prolonged delays and 
half-hearted measures have tarnished India’s 
reputation for delivering results,3 a stark contrast 
to China’s single-minded pursuit of the Silk 
Road infrastructural development project, now 
embodied in the One Belt One Road (OBOR) 
initiative. 
Second, by continuing to see the Central Asian 
region through the lens of Indo-Soviet ties, 
and as Russia’s backwater, India has failed to 
appreciate the scale of transformation over the 
past decades, the complexity of the region’s 
relations with Moscow and significant internal 
differentiation within the region. Unlike China, 
which has set up several institutes and think 
tanks dedicated to the study of various regions, 
including Central Asia, there is a shortage of 
Indian experts who combine linguistic skills 
(Russian and the relevant regional language[s]), 
academic training, cultural knowledge, and 
extended first-hand experience in the region.
Third, India has been unable to use its soft 
power and leverage in Afghanistan for forging 
closer all-round ties with the Central Asian 
states. The preoccupation with Pakistan and the 
continuing perception of the region as Russia’s 
backyard account for the lack of attention to 
Central Asia, which is compounded by inaction 
and inertia in overcoming the impediments 
posed by lack of geographical connectivity. 
In this backdrop, P. V. Narasimha Rao’s visit 
to the CARs in the early 1990s (he visited 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 1993 and 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan in 1995 as 
Tajikistan was still embroiled in the civil war 
then) was in essence a goodwill mission. 
Affirming Central Asia as an area of “high 
priority”, he described India as desiring “honest 
and open friendship and to promote stability 
and cooperation without causing harm to 
any third country.”4 This projected India as a 
benign neighbour and a time-honoured friend 
but offered no vision of the role it could play 
in promoting stability and easing the region’s 
tumultuous post-Soviet transition. 
All through the first decade of Central Asia’s 
independence, India’s impact remained 
limited to specific non-strategic niche areas 
of Indo-Soviet cooperation, such as technical 
assistance, pharmaceuticals, medicine, 
commerce, tourism, and cultural-educational 
ties. The “Look North” policy put forward in the 
late 1990s produced incremental shifts but its 
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accent was on projecting India’s influence as a 
“rising power” rather than on exploring avenues 
of tangible cooperation and engagement. 
The “Connect Central Asia” policy launched 
in 2012, affirmed the critical importance of 
geographical connectivity, transportation and 
trade networks for forging a comprehensive 
partnership across the greater Central Asian 
region, including Afghanistan. Taking a leaf out 
of China’s dynamic approach to the region, it 
envisaged a series of high-level meetings for 
revitalising the partnership and making India a 
prominent actor in the region. During his visit 
to the Tajikistan in October 2013, then Indian 
President Hamid Ansari called for the need 
“to develop and pursue individual policies with 
these [Central Asian] countries, bringing our 
interests on a converging platform.”5
Overall, the sluggish Indian response was 
conditioned largely by domestic factors and 
the broader regional context. India’s status and 
priorities in the 1990s and early 2000s were 
different: its economic growth was just about 
taking off, relations with the U.S. were tainted 
by the nuclear stalemate, ties with China were 
adversarial, mired in mutual suspicion, and the 
preoccupation with Pakistan was a constant 
refrain. 
Both India and Central Asia have changed 
profoundly since the establishment of diplomatic 
ties in the early 1990s. The rapid rise and 
subsequent decline in the U.S. engagement in 
the region and the perceived failure of U.S.-led 
policies to either promote democratic norms or 
build security in Afghanistan and the greater 
Eurasian region are leading to Central Asia’s 
reincorporation into Russia’s geopolitical and 
normative space while China further strengthens 
its control over the economy, trade and transport 
infrastructure. 
In this context, India is re-engaging with the 
region not only through strengthening bilateral 
relations, but also as a new member of the 
SCO, exploring avenues of cooperation with 
Russia-led EEU. Between Russia’s geopolitical 
and military power and China’s uncontested 
economic hold, India is establishing its 
imprint as a third force by capitalising on the 
favourable image of its soft power derived 
from its economic dynamism, democratic 
credentials, technological prowess, innovation, 
entrepreneurialism, cultural syncretism and 
historical linkages.
Modi’s Visit: Objectives and 
Outcomes
Modi’s Central Asia mission was an important 
breakthrough. It made India visible on the 
Central Asian political landscape with the world 
taking notice. Underlying high symbolism and 
festive ceremonies were fruitful agreements 
pointing to a long-term strategy, an action plan 
and practical measures aimed at addressing 
geographical constraints and India’s own 
self-imposed limitations which have kept the 
relations in limbo over past two decades.6
The first broad objective of the visit was to 
take concrete steps for enhancing economic 
and trade links with emphasis on energy and 
transport connectivity. The second key aim 
was to enhance and deepen India’s strategic 
engagement with the greater Central Asian 
region by building closer bilateral ties as well 
as multilateral partnerships to aid stability and 
development in Afghanistan. 
Two key processes coinciding with the visit 
bolster the prospects for a comprehensive 
Indian engagement. The first was the lifting 
of international economic sanctions on Iran 
which is a major conduit in the India-initiated 
project of building connectivity with the Central 
Asian states via sea route from the Chabahar 
port being built by India and by rail route from 
Chabahar through Afghanistan to landlocked 
parts of Central Asia. Second, the accession of 
India and Pakistan as full members of the SCO, 
announced at the joint SCO/BRICS forum in 
Ufa which Modi attended along with the informal 
summit of the EEU, establishes India as a firm 
player in Eurasia. The SCO membership of 
India and Pakistan comes into effect at the 2016 
summit in Tashkent.
5 http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/chinas-aid-to-tajikistan-does-not-clash-with-indias-interests-says-ansari/article4627846.
ece
6 “Can Modi reconnect India with Central Asia?’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-33421552.
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 7 Altay Sandybaev, “O sotrudnichestve s Indiei rassuzhdayut s pozitsii poiska ‘balanca’” [“Debating cooperation with India in the 
quest for a ‘balance’”]. Radio Azattyq, 8 July 2015. http://rus.azattyq.mobi/a/27116329.html 
8 “Itogi vizita prem’era Modi v Tsentral’nuyu Aziiu: India aktiviziruet sotrudnichestvo so stranami regiona.” [Summing up the visit 
of Prime Minister Modi to Central Asia: India activates partnership with the region”]. Fergana.ru. 13 July 2015. http://www.
fergananews.com/news/23627
9  “Kazakhstan i Indiia podpisali paket dokumentov o sotrudnichestve,” [“Kazakhstan and India sign a packet of documents on 
cooperation,”] 7 July 2015. http://newskaz.ru/economy/20150707/9049138.html
1. TRADE, ENERGY COOPERATION AND TRANSPORT CONNECTIVITY 
Expanding Trade and Energy 
Cooperation
India’s insignificant economic and trade relations 
with the region, hamstrung by lack of physical 
connectivity, are not an accurate measure of its 
standing in the region. But economic and trade 
ties are important in making India visible as a 
soft power and a vital strategic actor. India’s 
trade with the Central Asian region has reached 
US$2 billion now, as the volume has doubled 
over last few years. But it is less than 0.5 per 
cent of India’s overall trade volume, and a 
fraction of the region’s over US$100 billion trade 
with China, less than a sixth of the region’s trade 
with Turkey and less than a quarter of its trade 
with Iran. India’s private investment remains 
trifle at just about US$30 million.
Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, and Mr Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov , President of Turkmenistan, at the Signing 
Ceremony of the Agreements in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan on 11 July 2015. (Courtesy: PIB India)
Kazakhstan, as the most prosperous, reform-
oriented economy in the region, enjoying a 
close partnership with Russia, China, and a 
growing stature in the West, is the largest and 
most reliable economic and strategic partner of 
India.7 The trade volume between both countries 
reached an all-time peak at US$1.3 billion in 
2014, up from US$500 million in 2012 and $670 
million in 2013, thanks to cooperation in crucial 
sectors such as oil and gas, atomic energy, IT, 
agriculture and pharmaceuticals.8
President Nursultan Nazarbaev hailed Modi’s 
visit as offering a roadmap of partnership 
based on similarity of objectives and agendas 
and called for further Indian investments in 
the energy, IT, space research and technology 
sectors.9 Kazakhstan is also keen to promote 
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10 “Kazakhstan i Indiia podpisali paket dokumentov o sotrudnichestve,” [“Kazakhstan and India sign a packet of documents on 
cooperation,”] 7 July 2015. http://newskaz.ru/economy/20150707/9049138.html
11 “PM Narendra Modi launches OVL oil block project in Kazakhstan,” The Economic Times, 7 July 2015. http://articles.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-07-07/news/64178283_1_satpayev-oil-block-ovl-satpayev-vostochni
12 “India, Turkmenistan ink 7 pacts, agree to combat terrorism together,” The Indian Express, 11 July 2015. http://indianexpress.
com/article/india/india-others/indiaturkmenistan-ink-7-pacts-pm-modi-for-early-operation-of-tapi/. On Sushma Swaraj’s brief 
stopover at Ashgabat, see http://www.indiandefencereview.com/indias-central-asia-connect-may-lie-through-ashgabat/
a diversification of its economy and is 
seeking to extend cooperation in sectors 
such as transportation, telecommunications, 
petrochemicals, food processing, 
pharmaceuticals, mining sector, and real 
estate.10 Its enormous land expanses are 
attractive for large-scale commercial farming 
and there is considerable scope for concluding 
land lease agreements with India given 
Kazakhstan’s small population and the quest for 
establishing food security. 
India has made a belated but firm imprint on 
the hydrocarbon landscape of Kazakhstan by 
concluding vital nuclear and oil exploration 
deals. The 2011 agreement on nuclear 
cooperation signified a major advance in 
India’s strategic engagement in the region. A 
fresh four-year deal on supply of 5000 tons of 
enriched uranium to India will provide fuel for 
India’s 21 operating nuclear reactors and marks 
a new phase in bilateral cooperation in the 
energy sphere. It was only in 2011 that ONGC 
Videsh Ltd (OVL), the overseas branch of the 
state-owned Oil and Natural Gas Corporation 
(ONGC), obtained a 25 per cent share of the 
Satpaev oil block in the North Caspian with 
Kazakhstan owning the remaining 75 per cent. 
After numerous delays, drilling began in the 
Satpaev block in which India has pledged 
US$400 million for exploration. India has 
already spent US$13 million to sign the deal, 
US$80 million as a one-time assignment fee 
to KazMunaiGas (KMG) and US$150 million 
in exploration. While OVL estimates a peak 
output of 287,000 barrels per day, mounting 
costs, slump in oil prices and differences with 
the Kazakh government have slowed efforts by 
Western investors to expand offshore production 
of oil and gas.11 Falling global oil prices and the 
lifting of sanctions on Iran make Kazakhstani 
oil less attractive in the short and medium-term 
but India requires a long-term perspective and 
planning in order to enhance the security of 
energy supply. 
Turkmenistan’s enormous gas reserves and 
relative proximity hold even greater promise for 
India. The 1,800 km long projected TAPI pipeline 
from Turkmenistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan 
and India, estimated to supply about 30 billion 
square metres of gas a year to India, can also 
bring enormous benefits to Turkmenistan. 
Despite active backing by the U.S. and the 
Asian Development Bank, little progress has 
been attained due to the volatility in Afghan and 
Pakistani sections of the proposed pipeline. 
Renewing the plea to develop the TAPI 
pipeline, Modi described it as “the most 
significant initiative” of India’s relationship with 
Turkmenistan. Aspiring to become a regional 
transport hub on the strength of its outlet to the 
Caspian Sea, forging close ties with Iran and 
Turkey and growing energy cooperation with 
China, Turkmenistan is keen to promote TAPI as 
well as to implement the “Ashgabat Agreement”, 
signed in its capital in 2011 between Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman and Qatar. It seeks 
to establish a new international transport and 
transit corridor linking the 5 countries, including 
developing the shortest trade corridor between 
the Central Asian countries and Iranian and 
Omani ports and rail links running through 
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, 
inaugurated earlier this year, to connect further 
to Iran. 
Negotiations on India signing the Ashgabat 
Agreement and developing the TAPI pipeline 
and Turkmenistan joining the India-led INSTC 
have gathered pace with External Affairs 
Minister Sushma Swaraj stopping over in 
Ashgabat in October 2015 en route to Russia.12 
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Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar addressing the 6th Coordination Council Meeting of International North South Transport 
Corridor in New Delhi on 21 August 2015. (Courtesy: MEA/Flickr)
Keen to get TAPI off the ground, President 
Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov has ordered 
Turkmengaz and Turkmengazneftstroi to begin 
Turkmenistan’s section of the pipeline and 
complete it by 2018. However, both countries 
need to renegotiate TAPI’s planned pricing 
scheme to “reflect the new realities” of the global 
slump in oil prices and the availability of Iranian 
oil.13
Keeping India’s options open, Modi also hinted 
at exploring the possibility of a land-sea route 
through Iran for the pipeline: the option of a 
Turkmenistan-Iran-India (TII) pipeline seems 
more plausible with the removal of sanctions on 
Iran.14 By signing agreements for cooperation 
in the areas of chemicals and fertilisers, health 
and medicine, including yoga and traditional 
medicine, tourism, defence and science and 
technology with Turkmenistan, India is also 
using its soft power for forging a closer energy 
partnership.
India has the potential to play a vital role in 
developing the hydropower sector of Tajikistan. 
With over 80 per cent of its territory being 
mountainous, Tajikistan possesses nearly 4 per 
cent of global hydropower generation potential, 
but most of it remains untapped.15 The Soviet-
built infrastructure, still under Russia’s indirect 
control, is in need of massive renovation though 
Russia has been unable to bring in financial 
investment and technological know-how. India 
has spent US$20 million in grants towards the 
modernisation of the Varzob-1 Hydro Power 
Station and is exploring further collaboration 
in the hydropower and solar energy sectors in 
which Russia has a decisive say regarding any 
external investment.
The deep historical ties, as well as the affection 
held in Uzbekistan for India have not paved 
the way for an advance in economic and trade 
partnership due to unattractive investment 
conditions in Uzbekistan and lack of initiative 
by India. The total trade turnover between 
India and Uzbekistan was US$315.9 million in 
2014 and is projected to increase with better 
connectivity between the two states. Uzbekistan 
13 Sanjeev Choudhary, “India to renegotiate TAPI gas prices.” The Economic Times, 9 November 2015 http://articles.
economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-11-09/news/68134142_1_turkmenistan-mmscm
14 Casey Michel, “Modi in Central Asia: Goodbye TAPI, Hello TII?” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/modi-in-central-
asia-goodbye-tapi-hello-tii/ 
15 Kailash K. Prasad and Rani D. M. “India – Tajikistan Bilateral Brief,” India Development Cooperation Research (IDCR) Project, 
Bilateral Brief no. 5, 5 December 2013 (last updated 15th May, 2014). Available at http://idcr.cprindia.org/blog/india-tajikistan-
brief-0.
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16 http://www.ca-portal.ru/article:20254
17 Anil Sasi, “10 years on, SCO decides to induct India as full member,” The Indian Express. 11 July 2015. http://indianexpress.
com/article/business/business-others/10-years-on-sco-decides-to-induct-india-as-full-member/#sthash.g2oTeq6r.dpuf
18  Ria Novosti, 18 August 2015. http://ria.ru/interview/20150818/1191198664.html
is eager to establish cooperation with India in 
security spheres - defence, counter-terrorism, 
and cyber-security - alongside with medical and 
educational spheres, particularly IT, knowledge 
transfer and cultural ties. 
Kyrgyzstan is struggling to consolidate its 
nascent democratic institutions amid the 
increase in Russian military, economic and 
political control and waning of Western interest 
in the country’s democratic process. The 
acknowledgement by Modi that the smallest of 
all CARs is an equal partner with India in terms 
of advancement of democratic norms was vital 
to the fledgling Kyrgyz parliamentary democracy. 
The Election Commissions of both countries 
signed agreements on cooperation in the field of 
elections and conduct of referendums through 
the use of advanced IT software in legislative 
processes and parliamentary procedures.16
 
As India tries to carve out its niche in areas 
where China and Russia have already set 
standards, norms and expectations, India’s 
strategy has been to focus on its strengths in 
sectors such as small business and enterprise, 
digital connectivity, pharmaceuticals, medicine 
and health, construction and service. India’s 
efforts to forge a close strategic partnership 
rest on how it deploys its soft power by 
offering cooperation and aid in capacity 
building, knowledge transfer, people-to-people 
contact, and bolstering its developmental and 
humanitarian assistance.
Transport Connectivity: 
Complementarity and Beyond
the Great Game
Lack of physical connectivity with the region, 
protracted conflict with Pakistan, and extensive 
involvement in Afghanistan have constrained 
India’s engagement with Central Asia despite its 
growing energy demand and the proximity with 
the energy-abundant states.
Modi renewed India’s commitment to establish 
physical connectivity through building the 
INSTC, which will lower the costs by 30 per cent 
and distance by 40 per cent and boost India’s 
trade and investments in the energy sector. He 
also punctuated it by calling for developing “a 
vast network of physical and digital connectivity 
that extends from Eurasia’s northern corner to 
Asia’s southern shores.”17 With India, Russia 
and Iran signatories to the INSTC cooperation 
agreement in September 2000, India is now 
seeking the active participation of the Central 
Asian states in developing the route.
Work on the INSTC is to begin in early 2016 to 
link the Indian port of Mumbai to Iran’s Bandar 
Abbas where the route goes overland to Baku 
in Azerbaijan and along the Caspian Sea to 
Astrakhan in Russia, proceeding finally to 
Moscow and other parts of Europe.18 Sanctions 
on Iran and dithering on the part of India had 
slowed the pace of construction and completion 
of the Chabahar port and the 900 km railway line 
connecting it to the mineral-rich Hajigak region 
in Afghanistan (where Indian companies have 
secured a huge iron mining concession) via the 
Baluchi-speaking region of Iran. 
Given the enormous logistical and strategic 
challenges, risks and costs, India needs to 
offer strategic planning, timely action, active 
diplomacy and enormous investments to 
execute the project. A stark contrast to India’s 
INSTC is China’s US$46 billion infrastructure 
investment in Pakistan, announced during 
President Xi Jinping’s visit to Islamabad in April 
2015. China is upgrading the Gwadar port on 
Pakistan’s Arabian Sea coast, located about 80 
km east of Chabahar, and building highways, 
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railways and pipelines in a 3000 km-long 
economic corridor to link Gwadar to Kashgar in 
Xinjiang province in western China. This makes 
India’s INSTC “the tortoise to China’s OBOR 
hare.”19
While INSTC has a geopolitical and economic 
rationale, India needs further infrastructural 
investments and a vision which rises above 
geopolitical competition and regional rivalries. 
Entering into competition with China or ignoring 
its pervasive imprint on the Central Asian region 
19 Micha’el Tanchum, “Modi and the Sino-Indian Game for Iranian Gas: The Indian prime minister makes his opening move in a 
mini ‘Great Game’.” The Diplomat, 17 July 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/modi-and-the-sino-indian-game-for-iranian-gas/ 
post-sanctions.
is neither possible nor desirable. In other words, 
India’s quest for connectivity requires continuing 
bilateral agreements with Iran, Turkmenistan, 
and Afghanistan as well as cooperation with 
China’s Silk Road projects. After a lukewarm 
initial response, India joined the China-led 
US$100 billion Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) in June 2015, pledging $8 billion. It 
is the second largest share-holder after China in 
the AIIB, which is to become operational in early 
2016.
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20 Cholpon Orozbekova, “Central Asia and the ISIS Phantom: The region’s leaders have been playing up the ISIS threat. How 
real is it?” The Diplomat, 2 October 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/central-asia-and-the-isis-phantom/
Security Partnership and Soft Power
Accustomed to seeing the Central Asian 
region through a Soviet and Russian-centred 
perspective, India is beginning to pay attention 
to the region in its own right to forge deeper 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation on 
stability and security enhancing measures in 
Afghanistan. However, the role and extent of 
its security engagement in Central Asia remain 
delimited by Russia’s priorities and interests in 
the region.
Tajikistan, which borders Afghanistan, China, 
Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan, is a critical hub 
in Indian and Russian-led efforts to stabilise 
Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s leadership has 
periodically expressed its concerns about the 
worsening security climate in Afghanistan and 
the rising extremist threats within the country. 
While the Central Asian region is vulnerable to 
Islamic terrorism from the resurgent Taliban and 
the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), its 
leaders have also utilised the threat to intensify 
repression, tighten control and extract support 
from neighbouring powers.20
Under a bilateral agreement with Russia 
as well as the CSTO (Collective Security 
Treaty Organization, headed by Russia, with 
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
and Tajikistan as members), Russia’s 201st 
Motor Rifle Division comprising 7,000 troops 
(additional troops were sent earlier this 
year), is to remain in Tajikistan until 2042 
and use facilities in Dushanbe, Kulob, and 
Qurghonteppa. Since the end of the bloody 
civil war in 1993-95 in which Russia brokered 
a peacekeeping deal, Tajikistan has continued 
to depend on Russia to combat threats from 
militant Islamic groups in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan as well as insurgencies and security 
challenges in the Rasht Valley and more 
recently in Gorno-Badakhshan region. With 
almost half of Tajikistan’s economy depending 
on remittances from its migrants in Russia 
(almost one million Tajiks, out of a population 
of 8 million, work in Russia), the latter is the de 
facto provider of its security.
Shri Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India, and Mr Emomali Rahmon, President of Tajikistan having a tête-à-tête in Dushanbe, 
Tajikistan on 13 July 2015. (Courtesy: PIB India)
2. SECURITY AND STRATEGIC COOPERATION
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Until the mid-2000s, the Indian Air Force 
operated the Farkhor air base, 130 km 
southeast of Dushanbe, in collaboration with the 
Tajik Air Force to send supplies to the Northern 
Alliance in Afghanistan in fighting the Taliban. 
There was also a military hospital at Farkhor 
which has been closed. India has since been 
offering training to Tajik pilots and military 
personnel and has established a military hospital 
in another location inside Tajikistan. 
Despite widespread anticipation that talks will 
also centre on India’s interest in renting the air 
base at Ayni, located 15 km west of Dushanbe, 
there was no official word on the issue. India 
has spent US$70 million since 2007 on 
modernisation of the military aerodrome at Ayni 
which had served as a key Soviet base during 
Moscow’s involvement in Afghanistan. Official 
Tajik sources said that the Ayni air base was not 
a topic for discussion during Modi’s visit. India’s 
silence on Ayni has fuelled rumours about 
differences between India and Russia over the 
terms for the use of the military facility, which 
are said to have thwarted India’s bid to obtain 
a military base.21 Notwithstanding pervasive 
speculation within India and beyond, there is “no 
evidence that such a base exists or is even in 
the works.”22
While a secondary player in the Central Asian 
military and security sphere, India is more visible 
as a provider of developmental aid to Tajikistan. 
Though Tajikistan has received the bulk of 
Indian development assistance to Central Asia 
over the past decade, it is a fraction of what 
India offers to Afghanistan or to other states 
in Africa.23 The India-Tajik Friendship Hospital 
which opened in 2014 in Qurghonteppa in 
Khatlon province has 73 Indian doctors working 
and training Tajik staff. Earlier, India donated 
two million doses of polio vaccine to Dushanbe 
in 2010 to combat the polio epidemic. India 
offers training programmes for officers, medical 
personnel, and scholarships for students to 
study in India and has built hotels and a major 
21 Stephen Blank, “Russian-Indian Row over Tajik Base Suggests Moscow Caught in Diplomatic Vicious Cycle.” Eurasianet.org. 10 
January 2008. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav011108f.shtml
22 Catherine Putz, “Will There Be an Indian Air Base in Tajikistan? A decade-old rumor springs to life again with Prime Minister 
Modi’s trip to Tajikistan.” The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2015/07/will-there-be-an-indian-air-base-in-tajikistan/
23 “India-Tajikistan Bilateral Brief.”
24 www.indianembassy.tj/ru/policy/policy.php?id=24
fruit processing plant, and renovated hydro 
power stations which have enabled Tajikistan to 
provide electricity to Afghanistan.24 However, the 
technical assistance and aid have not been well 
utilised due to deeply entrenched corruption and 
the absence of the rule of law.
Whatever role India may play in the provision 
of military assistance to Tajikistan, including 
some form of security presence, will be in 
coordination and agreement with Russia and will 
not encroach on the latter’s sphere of influence. 
Any enhanced Indian strategic role in Tajikistan, 
be it in modernising the hydropower sector, 
renting the Ayni airport base, or building a road 
connection also requires a delicate balance 
between securing the consent of Russia and 
also acting normatively in light of the deeply 
entrenched corruption and coercion in the 
country.
Modi welcomed Kyrgyzstan’s accession to 
the EEU – a clear recognition of the country’s 
security and economic re-alignment with Russia. 
Kyrgyzstan was the only country to have both 
U.S. and Russian military bases within a short 
distance from each other (in Manas and Kant 
respectively) since 11 September 2001. The 
termination of the rental agreement between 
the U.S. and Kyrgyz governments on the Manas 
Transit Centre, which was the primary air supply 
hub for the U.S. and International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) efforts in Afghanistan, 
has led to a revitalisation of Russia’s military 
role in the region. The Russian-operated air 
base at Kant is now part of the CSTO forces for 
enhancing security in the light of the withdrawal 
of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan 
and India enhanced defence and security 
cooperation with an agreement on holding joint 
military exercises and India offering training of 
Kyrgyz military officers for UN peacekeeping 
work, and medical assistance for the military 
hospital of the Kyrgyz Ministry of Defence. India 
also strengthened its niche as a soft power 
through an agreement on establishing 3 tele-
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medical centres in Osh, Issyk-kul and Talas 
regions in Kyrgyzstan offering distance learning 
and online consultations between Indian and 
Kyrgyz medical staff. This was followed by 
an agreement on establishing a “joint high 
mountainous bio-medical” research centre.
Implications of India’s SCO 
Membership
For Central Asian states, wedged between 
China’s increasing economic might and Russia’s 
geopolitical clout which is driving them to join 
the EEU – a political and ideological entity 
without a clear set of economic policies – India 
is a welcome third pillar, enjoying a favourable 
image.25 As the only democracy about to 
assume membership in the SCO, India’s entry 
can go on to dispel the representation of SCO 
as “anti-West” or as a foreign policy instrument 
of China. 
Founded as Shanghai Five in 1996 by China 
with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan, it was an instrument for securing 
China’s western borders and promoting 
border security within the region by combating 
what China terms the “3 evils of separatism, 
religious extremism and terrorism”. Joined by 
Uzbekistan in 1998 and renamed Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation, it has continued 
to expand its role, membership and widen its 
objectives. India applied for membership in 2005 
acceding to Russia’s request whereas Pakistan 
applied in 2006 under China’s encouragement. 
While Russia had actively pushed for India’s 
membership, subsequent discussions within 
led to consensus on admitting both India and 
Pakistan together. 
The impending pull-out of U.S.-NATO troops 
from Afghanistan also puts pressure on the SCO 
to extend its security umbrella. The membership 
of India (together with Pakistan) turns the 
SCO into a critical platform for achieving a 
greater coordination among China, Russia 
and India on efforts to stabilise Afghanistan 
through economic, infrastructural and human 
development efforts while engaging Pakistan in 
the process.
Contrary to some depictions of the SCO as 
an “Eastern NATO”, China has opposed any 
possible military role for SCO in the region. 
SCO has set up the Regional Anti-Terrorist 
Structure (RATS) in 2004 in Tashkent, capital 
of Uzbekistan, to share intelligence on cross-
border Islamic terrorist activities. It has also 
sought to establish cooperation on security, 
combating drug trafficking and terrorism across 
the region. However, the lack of trust among 
members, a broad and politicised definition of 
terrorism, and pursuit of divergent agendas by 
member states have limited multilateral security 
cooperation through RATS. 
With India and Pakistan to participate as 
full SCO members in 2016 at the summit 
in Tashkent, the SCO focus is likely to shift 
to regional security matters, particularly on 
stabilising Afghanistan, and to countering the 
threat posed by ISIS to the region. As Russia 
and China, described as two “godfathers”, 
pursue their own specific interests while 
maintaining a strategic balance within the 
SCO,26 India will need to define its priorities and 
display clear initiative if SCO is to turn into a 
viable framework of strategic cooperation. 
Currently, the Russian-led CSTO, with a 
mandate to deploy Rapid Reaction Forces in 
any member state’s territory in case of any 
external or internal threat, is the only ostensible 
“security provider” in the region. Though 
Russia has boosted its military presence in 
Tajikistan in the last couple of years to combat 
drug trafficking and insurgencies within that 
fragile state,27 the actual ability of the CSTO 
to deploy force remains limited. At the same 
time, Russia remains opposed to any long-term 
military presence of U.S. and NATO troops in 
25 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the EEU (which also has Belarus and Armenia). Tajikistan may be next in line. 
Turkmenistan is not part of any Russia-led arrangements such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or CSTO and 
espouses neutrality as its foreign policy doctrine.
26 Jean Pierre Cabestan, “The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Central Asia and the Great Powers, an Introduction” One Bed, 
Different Dreams?” Asian Survey 53, 3 (May-June 2013): 423-35
27 http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/18/russias-growing-military-presence-tajikistan/
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Afghanistan. In contrast, China has shown a 
willingness to cooperate on security issues 
and is not averse to long-term U.S. presence 
in Afghanistan which helps safeguard the 
enormous Chinese investments there. 
As of now, SCO remains a common framework, 
a loose alliance for strategic and economic 
cooperation for advancing common security 
interests as collective goods beneficial to 
the region. Lacking the means, capability or 
consensus to become a security umbrella, SCO 
is currently “walking on its two legs (Russia and 
China), in order to cycle”, to quote a Maoist 
saying.28 India is potentially a third pillar which 
can contribute to securing better coordination 
with the U.S.-led efforts at stabilising 
Afghanistan and the greater Eurasian region.
New Beginnings: A Late Start Better 
than a False One 
“India is a day late and a dollar too short”, 
observed a Western diplomat in a private 
exchange with the author in 2004. Yet to see 
India’s lack of a meaningful engagement as a 
failure, as a “missed” opportunity, and rank it as 
a distant third regional actor behind the CARs’ 
two formidable neighbours traps the analysis 
within a zero-sum competitive logic. Such an 
analysis accentuates the limitations, rather than 
identifying the niche areas and potential for 
cooperation based on India’s strengths, norms 
and the depth of historical connections and 
goodwill. 
India’s “late start” stems from a combination 
of factors: geographic barriers, domestic 
preoccupation, lack of vision on its policy 
towards Central Asia, and regional and global 
factors. The India of the 1990s and early 
2000s, which was in confrontation with the 
U.S., insecure with its neighbours and in 
an asymmetrical relationship with Russia in 
strategic and military affairs, could neither have 
constituted an independent vector in the region 
nor capitalised on the strength of its historical 
ties. Thus, a late start on a more secure footing 
with a clearer set of objectives serves it better 
than an early involvement without an adequate 
capacity, plan and wherewithal to advance its 
objectives in the region.
As an aspiring global actor and an established 
regional power, seeking to establish deeper 
connectivity with the region and contribute 
to regional security and development, India 
will also need to rise above its preoccupation 
with Pakistan and anxieties over China while 
rendering strategic depth to its relations with 
all the Central Asian states. SCO can offer 
an additional diplomatic forum to engage with 
Pakistan, though the Modi government, akin to 
its predecessors, has hitherto preferred direct 
bilateral channels for talking to Pakistan.
India’s assets are its neutral but positive image 
in Central Asia, close and secure partnership 
with both Russia and the West, and growing 
cooperation with China. Analogous to its role in 
Afghanistan, India can build on its soft power, 
expand humanitarian-developmental assistance, 
and facilitate greater people-to-people 
contact in order to develop an independent 
strategic presence. India’s ability to become 
an impartial third vector also depends on its 
capacity to make the requisite technological 
and financial investments in the fields of energy 
and transportation infrastructure and facilitate 
vital security arrangements while enhancing 
its standing in the global arena by pushing 
for transformation of norms and institutions of 
international governance. 
The improving relationship between Iran and the 
West following the nuclear deal is an opening 
which should give India an opportunity to 
demonstrate its strategic role in Central Asia. 
This means New Delhi must move speedily 
and purposefully to deliver what has been 
promised. Bureaucratic inertia has undermined 
India’s chance to play catch-up previously. 
Going forward, the ability of Narendra Modi to 
charm the younger and technologically savvy 
generation to support his forays into foreign 
policy and refurbish India’s credentials has to be 
substantiated. India’s strategic equity in Central 
Asia should not be eroded further by default.
28 Cabestan, ibid.
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?? Lack of physical connectivity has been the 
number one barrier to India’s engagement 
in the region. Bringing to fruition the 
existing projects on establishing physical 
connectivity with the Central Asian region 
is absolutely essential for India to become 
a critical actor in the region. A speedy 
completion of construction of the Chabahar 
port and railroad link through Afghanistan 
to Turkmenistan is central to the Indian-led 
development of INSTC.
?? Boosting trade and commercial ties with the 
region should be on top of India’s priorities 
because these links are vital to projecting its 
soft power. Various small-scale projects by 
Indian companies dotted throughout Central 
Asia need to be given a policy and strategic 
context, and where possible official support 
in implementation and timely completion. 
At the same time, India can achieve 
its objectives better through increasing 
developmental and humanitarian aid to 
the region and promoting closer people-to-
people ties through education, knowledge 
transfer, medicine and health, culture and 
tourism sectors.
?? India will need to display leadership 
in forging greater coordination and 
cooperation with Turkmenistan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan in the efforts at stabilising 
Afghanistan. It needs to deploy both 
soft and hard power to gain access to 
Afghanistan through Tajikistan by increasing 
humanitarian and developmental assistance 
to the Tajiks and by reaching a quid pro 
quo with Russia on the common cause of 
combating extremism and terrorism.
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
?? Sustained diplomatic efforts are needed 
for advancing the construction of TAPI by 
engaging in negotiations with all parties 
to ensure long-term security of energy 
supply. Membership of SCO offers a useful 
multilateral platform to engage in dialogue 
with Pakistan on this and other issues 
which will enable India to strike a workable 
relationship with Pakistan.
?? India must draw on its all-round partnership 
with the U.S. to foster cooperation 
between the West, Russia, and China 
for enhancing stability and security in the 
region. Perhaps a beginning can be made 
through multilateral dialogue on energy and 
infrastructural development cooperation.
?? India’s engagement with SCO and AIIB is 
a positive start. Forging closer cooperation 
with China on the basis of complementarity 
of interests and objectives is critical for 
advancing India’s connectivity projects in 
Central Asia. 
?? India needs to develop new initiatives and 
vision to work closely with China and Russia 
in shaping multilateral regional structures 
and incorporating Afghanistan in the broader 
framework. Likewise, it needs to engage 
in dialogue with EEU and identify areas 
of partnership in ways which also take 
into account the interests and well-being 
of Central Asian member states. Indian 
industry and entrepreneurs will benefit from 
economic liberalisation and market opening 
of the CARs.
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